Between Deeper Integration and Political Fragmentation
Washington’s disengagement from European security has brought questions of sovereignty, defence and power back to the centre of the debate, reviving the ideal of a United States of Europe. However, this path raises profound tensions that reopen historical dilemmas surrounding identity, legitimacy and sovereignty, posing far-reaching questions and challenging the extent to which deeper integration could itself become the greatest risk to the continuity of the European project.
One of the fundamental questions is whether the European Union possesses the necessary political conditions to sustain such a qualitative leap. The Maastricht Treaty (1992) marked a turning point by introducing political integration aimed at an “ever closer union”. This process has involved the gradual transfer of powers traditionally held by states to a supranational level, amid a constant tension between functional integration and national sovereignty.
This dichotomy, far from being resolved, has been managed through successive crises in order to deepen federalism. First, the euro crisis led to unprecedented mechanisms of fiscal oversight. Second, the pandemic resulted in the joint issuance of debt, something Germany had rejected for decades. More recently, the war in Ukraine has driven, for the first time, the joint procurement of military equipment. In each case, urgency facilitated transfers of power that, under ordinary circumstances, would have required treaty reforms or even the holding of a referendum. This pattern has demonstrated the EU’s capacity to react in times of crisis, but it has also reinforced the perception that European integration is driven by political elites without meaningful citizen involvement.
The underlying problem lies in legitimacy. As the European Union moves towards federalism by expanding the powers of its institutions, the growing distance between the centres of decision-making and citizens becomes increasingly apparent. The European Commission, despite its growing and increasingly decisive political role, is not directly elected, while a substantial part of national legislation consists of the transposition of regulations and directives defined in Brussels. Furthermore, the expansion of qualified majority voting means that decisions can be adopted without the consent of all Member States.
This structure profoundly limits national sovereignty, making it necessary to question how a fully legitimate political system at the European level can be constructed in a way that is sustainable in the long term. Although comparisons with other historical models must be approached with caution, the evolution of the European project invites us to seriously consider analogies that few dare to voice openly. Beyond ideological differences, the European Union and the Soviet Union share a tendency to address their dysfunctions through the progressive centralisation of powers in bureaucratic bodies with limited accountability. In the Soviet case, this dynamic fostered a dogmatism detached from citizens and social reality, in which signs of political resistance were interpreted as obstacles rather than as warnings to be addressed. This intensified the system’s internal contradictions, ultimately contributing to its collapse and triggering one of the greatest geopolitical crises of the twentieth century.
Resistance to the European project is not new. The rejection of the European Constitution in referendums held in France and the Netherlands, two founding members, in 2005, as well as the subsequent reformulation of the text in the Treaty of Lisbon without submitting it to a popular vote, marked a turning point. This episode left a legacy of distrust that has not disappeared. Later, Brexit demonstrated that a significant part of the population perceived the European project as distant or imposed. Reducing these phenomena to disinformation or populism is not reasonable. The data point to a deeper trend, such as the sustained growth of openly Eurosceptic forces, which secured 28% of the seats in the European Parliament in 2024, as well as significant levels of public disengagement from European institutions, with 51% of the population expressing such sentiments according to the 2024 Eurobarometer. These indicators point to a problem of acceptance that cannot be resolved by accelerating federalisation, but rather through greater democratic participation.
This fragility is compounded by the continent’s structural diversity, as not all countries share the same political outlook. There are different degrees of integration, even within the European Union itself, which is by no means a homogeneous bloc. The divergent positions of certain Member States, such as Hungary or Poland on questions of sovereignty, reflect deep tensions over the model of integration, particularly in areas such as the rule of law, foreign policy and defence. In the latter field, decades of structural dependence on NATO, acknowledged in the Treaty on European Union itself, together with the absence of a fully integrated military architecture, constrain the Union’s ability to act autonomously.
Despite these limitations, the achievements of European cooperation are remarkable. The free movement of capital, people, goods and services is historically significant. It has profoundly transformed the continent, turning it into one of the world’s major economic centres, with the capacity to project international influence and establish global standards across a multitude of areas, such as competition, digital regulation and data protection. This external projection is complemented by joint industrial and technological projects. Successful examples such as the European Space Agency, Ariane, Airbus and the Eurofighter Typhoon demonstrate that Europe can achieve high levels of cooperation through the convergence of interests without the need to become a federal state.
Europe is a plural civilisation, shaped by diverse political, historical and cultural traditions. In this sense, a supranational construction, even more so than nation-states, can hardly be sustained if a disconnect persists between decision-making centres and society. The growing rejection of European institutions is partly a consequence of this. Before undertaking any further qualitative leap, Europe needs to introduce mechanisms for participation that can legitimise its institutions and ensure the long-term sustainability of the project. Cases such as Switzerland demonstrate that the most cohesive political communities are not necessarily the most homogeneous, but rather those in which citizens have actively participated in defining their own rules. If this democratic deficit is not addressed, the risk will not be the stagnation of integration, but its gradual disintegration, with consequences that could extend beyond the continent and affect the balance of the international order.
By Gabriel Acevedo, Geostrategy Analyst · NNGG Spain
