“Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” — the world is one family — is one of those Sanskrit lines that can sound either lofty or practical, depending on the decade you live in. Right now, it reads as a reminder that in a fragmented world, the countries that still manage to cooperate tend to do better than those that only complain about fragmentation.
On 27 January 2026, the EU and India concluded negotiations on what the European Commission calls a landmark Free Trade Agreement — the largest trade deal ever concluded by either side. Ursula von der Leyen went for the big framing: “The EU and India make history today… We have created a free trade zone of 2 billion people” and proved that “rules-based cooperation still delivers great outcomes.”
Fine. But if you want to know whether this is more than a press conference, look at the boring parts: tariffs, quotas, compliance, and the incentives they create. The EU and India already trade over €180 billion in goods and services each year, supporting close to 800,000 EU jobs. The Commission expects the deal to double EU exports to India by 2032, helped by the elimination or reduction of tariffs on 96.6% of EU goods exports, with roughly €4 billion per year saved in duties.
Three tariff lines make the point without the theatre:
- Cars: from 110% down to as low as 10% (with a quota framework).
- Wine: from 150% to 20–30% depending on category.
- Olive oil: from up to 45% to 0% over time.
This is where “geopolitics” stops being an abstract word and becomes a set of choices. Europe wants competitiveness, fewer dependencies, and more say over the rules that govern technology, supply chains, and climate policy. India is not a side market; it is the world’s most populous country and one of the fastest-growing large economies. If Europe is serious about being a geopolitical actor, it cannot afford to treat India as a footnote.
The EPP Group’s line is blunt, and it captures the mood: this is “a strategic necessity” tied to “geopolitical leverage”. One does not have to agree with every adjective to recognise the underlying point: partnerships are becoming a form of resilience.
There is also a less glamorous, but more important, “youth” angle here — not in the form of slogans, but of pathways. The agreement includes an SME chapter and practical contact points, the kind of plumbing that helps smaller firms actually use a deal. That matters because Europe’s jobs story is increasingly written by scale-ups, specialised manufacturers, and service exporters — precisely the ecosystem where many early-career opportunities sit.
And the sustainability dimension is not just decoration. The agreement includes a Trade and Sustainable Development chapter (climate and environmental protection, workers’ rights, women’s empowerment), and it points to an EU–India climate cooperation platform planned for H1 2026, with envisaged EU support for sustainable industrial transformation. In a world
of carbon constraints and credibility tests, standards are not moral vanity; they are part of market access.
One line of critique, because credibility requires it: none of this will matter if implementation drags — if ratification turns into a slow-motion drama, or if SME tools remain a brochure rather than a working system.
Europe does not need a deal that merely looks impressive on paper. It needs one that turns strategic intent into outcomes — for competitiveness, for Europe’s geopolitical presence, and for global sustainability.
By László Szepessy, MIERT International Secretary
