

# WG 1 - EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES AND NATO

#### 1. Introduction

Over forty years ago the "Harmel Report" described NATO as "a dynamic and vigorous organisation which is constantly adapting itself to changing conditions". Today, more than ever, we see that a changing geo-political landscape challenges and perhaps even threatens the Institution in a fundamental way. The fall of communism, political evolution in Russia, gradual enlargement of the EU and recent terrorist attacks *in the world*- all of which have occurred in the past fifteen years - have posed *new challenges* for NATO and have considerably altered the role of NATO in the new world order.

The impending accession of ten new member states to the European Union, most of whom are, or will become, members of NATO, will add to the challenges facing NATO and its role in relation to European security and defence.

#### 2. European Military Deficiencies – Identifying the Problems

Two overwhelming problems face the EU's capacity to develop its defence mechanisms. Firstly, the unavailability of essential intelligence and technology is restricting its military ability. While the Balkan conflict at the beginning of the 1990s revealed European incapacity, the Kosovo conflict later in the decade exposed a transatlantic gap in military technology, which was going to widen as time went on. This intelligence gulf between the US and Europe continues to be a major weakness from the perspective of the EU and of the transatlantic relationship as a whole.

The second problem is its failure to match Europe's military capability with its expenditure in the area (the bang for the buck). The EU spends 60% of the US's defence budget yet it has but 10% of its capability. These unsustainable figures should be corrected through co-operation and co-ordination in military budgets.

In order to deal with the former problem, closer co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is necessary. The EU and NATO are inextricably linked. This link will be even ore pronounced many of the ten new EU member states will also be members of NATO. Closer co-operation with NATO would lead to the sharing of essential strategic military intelligence.

Greater EU-NATO co-operation would also lead to the partial remedy of the latter obstacle. The military infrastructure available to NATO should be used

to the advantage of the EU. This would prevent overlapping of resources and provide a European army with capabilities which are at present strikingly absent, such as essential air lift and marine capabilities.

Naturally the rights of non-NATO members must be respected. However such Member States must not be allowed veto or restrict co-operation, rather their right to abstain should be respected.

#### 3. How to Develop Closer Co-operation – Hard Choices

NATO has reached a watershed in its history. While there are fundamental questions being raised as to the viability and role of NATO globally, in its current form (many believing that its traditional role is redundant since the break-up of the USSR), Europeans are faced with a more complex choice of Europe's own direction and role within the structures of NATO.

YEPP favours that Europe will play an integrated role in NATO, but will also realise her own potential as a military force, developing her own capacity, while maintaining close co-operation with NATO at all levels.

We support the development of a strong Europe, with independent capabilities. Ironically, we believe that this will in fact enhance Europe's position within NATO and will in fact strengthen NATO, making her more productive and more effective on the world stage. The development of EU capacity should not lead into duplication.

## 4. How Will Europe's Role in NATO Strengthen?

Both Americans and Europeans have isolated themselves into unilateral approaches which risk making them both losers. They must work to intensify strategic consultation, policy co-ordination and crisis management through NATO.

Our objective as Europeans should be to encourage the "multilateralisation" of US foreign policy by strengthening our position in NATO. This does not mean uniting against the US hegemon, but rather by setting as our collective objective, the creation of a European counterveiling force that has the ability to act independently of the United States. The aim is to create a genuine and open partnership within NATO

## 5. The Development of CFSP & Implications for NATO

Pooling of resources from NATO and the EU is a crucial priority. This is particularly important form the point of view of strategic planning and exchange of intelligence. This is one of the areas where the EU is particularly inept. Operations planning is almost exclusively in the hands of the US, both in the context of NATO missions and in respect of any other multilateral operations. This is unsustainable. If Europe/the EU is to continue investing vast sums in security and defence, it must receive greater return for its investment. This will not occur unless two things happen. Firstly, the EU must develop her own intelligence gathering ability. Secondly, and most urgently, she must become privy to NATO intelligence, which NATO is currently reluctant to share. This aspect is most urgent as it is the most cost effective, practical and realistic option in the short to medium term.

The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, are crucial to the development of European security and defence. These arrangements enhance greatly the operational capability of the EU. They provide an important framework for the strategic partnership of the two organisations in their approach to crisis management.

NATO and the EU must co-operate on the basis of mutual advantage. It is crucial to avoid institutional duplication and to promote arrangements which can flexibly support the "dual-use" of a single set of forces, assets and capabilities. This does not mean that a European Army, or indeed the EU military budget, should be subsumed by NATO. We wish to see the creation of an independent EU Army, while ensuring this force compliments NATO activities, rather than doubling up efforts. Rather than duplicating in some aspects, and being deficient in others, niche expertise of individual member states should be enhanced and integrated into the overall EU army. This would lead to greater levels of interoperability and inter-dependence. It would also be cost-efficient. This should be seen as a resource that will enhance the European partnership with NATO, rather than as an outright alternative to NATO. It will advance both the European target of securing our borders, stabilising neighbouring regions and providing a counter-balancing influence to the USA in global defence issues, while ensuring a continued supportive partnership with the US via NATO.

## 6. Conclusion

We are faced with many new challenges and new opportunities. It is clear that in addressing these, the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. The US and the EU must work together in creating a formidable force for good in the world. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, although not perfect, provides the best architecture for ensuring that this is a reality. Recently retired NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, famously and appropriately referred to Europe as a "military pygme". The first step to overcoming a problem is to recognise it. The Iraq crisis underlined the ineptitude of EU Foreign Policy and how even NATO, the strongest global military alliance, can be easily sidelined by the great (and growing) world superpower. There is certainly an acute awareness of the need to work both within and without NATO, developing European military and strategic capability, in order to balance global foreign policy. The problem has been identified. It is now simply time to begin taking the necessary steps to achieve a lasting solution.